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NEW I<EYNESIANS, POST 
I<EYNESIANS AND HISTORY 
John B. Davis 
'The New- Keynesian research programme possesses a number of features w-hich are 
not unattractive to Post Keynesians. New- Keynesians reject policy ineffectiveness, 
laissez:faire New- Classical economics, and argue that the economy can lock into 
underemployment equilibria. New- Keynesians allow- for asymmetric information, 
imperfect competition, adjustment costs, externalities, strategic complementarity 
and increasing returns, and in some instances emphasize institutions and conven-
tions. Yet New- Keynesianism also possesses features Post I<eynesians are generally 
critical of, including the standard subjective probability framew-ork, rational expec-
tations, the ISLM model, an insistence on microfoundations for macroeconomics, 
a reliance on traditional optimizing behavioural analysis, and little interest in Key-
nes's own thinking. In contrast, Post Keynesians emphasize true uncertainty 
regarding the future, reject rational expectations, regard the ISLM model as 
artificial and static, call for macrofoundations for microeconomics, argue for richer 
accounts of individual economic behaviour, and draw- often on Keynes's o'Wn 
thinking. 
Among these differences, Post I<eynesians' emphasis on true uncertainty regard-
ing the future has been central. Thus an interesting issue is 'Whether there is also a 
related and equally strong dividing line between Post Keynesians and Ne'W Key-
nesians regarding the influence the past and our ignorance of it has on the present. 
Were both uncertainty about the future and ignorance about the past to distinguish 
Post Keynesianism from Ne'W Keynesianism, this might then point to'Wards import-
ant differences between the two research programmes in regard to their respective 
vie'Ws of the nature of economic behaviour. Recently Cross (1993) has suggested 
that there need not be important disagreements over the influence of the past by 
arguing that Post Keynesians might find the concept of hysteresis amenable to their 
understanding of the economic process. Hysteresis concerns phenomena that dis-
playa persistence of effects beyond the occasion of their initial causes. They may be 
thought characteristically historical in that the presence of such effects violates the 
standard presumption that physical systems are reversible. Indeed Post Keynesians 
have long used notions that apply irreversibility characteristics. Their analysis of 
fixed capital investment as fundamentally illiquid treats long-lived capital assets as 
firm- or at best industry-specific, and thus as rarely remarketed 'Without significant 
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loss. Their analysis of ITloney contracts focuses on the relation betw"een current and 
future ITloney flo'Ws and financial obligations deterITlined by past decisions. 
Katzner (1993) has replied, ho'Wever, that hysteresis as specifically understood by 
Cross and other contributors to the literature relies on systeITls of periodic equa-
tions that presuppose logical tiITle and perfect kno'Wledge, and that an analysis of 
the econoITlY in terms of true historical tiITle understood as unidirectional and 
irreversible better captures a Post Keynesian understanding of an econoITlic pro-
cess in tiITle. 1 Because <reality is over'WhelITlingly cOITlplicated', our perceptions of 
the past <are fraught with errors and gaps', iITlplying that <successive ITlOITlents in 
historical tiITle bring 'With theITl their o'Wn unique institutional and analytical 
structures' (p. 340). In effect, <history is created period by period' (p. 343), and 
ignorance about the past plays directly into our uncertainty about the future. 
Indeed, ignorance about the past and uncertainty about the future are but tw"o 
species of a kno'Wledge about the 'World 'Whose limitations rule out using subjective 
probability theory as an analytical device for econoITlics. 
Keynes clearly believed uncertainty about the future 'Was central to our under-
standing of the econoITlY. But ho'W did he understand the effect of the past on the 
present, and did he believe that the econOITlY ITloved in historical tiITle in the sense 
of being created period by period? In an effort to develop the foundations for Post 
KeynesianisITl in terITlS of Keynes's o'Wn thinking, Kregel (1976) distinguished three 
alternative ITlodels used by Keynes in The General Theory and in his 1937 lectures in 
connection vnth differing assuITlptions about the nature and interaction of short-
period and long-period price expectations. Dutt (1991-2) has argued, hov.rever, that 
only one of these three ITlodels is cOITlpatible 'With an account of the econoITly in 
v.rhich history ITlight be said to ITlatter in deterITlining the direction and develop-
ITlent of the econoITly. This chapter ITlakes use of Dutt's path-dependency ITlodel of 
Keynes's thinking to produce - if not an account of an econoITlY ITloving in true 
historical tiITle - none the less an account in v.rhich the past can be seen to have a 
pattern of deterITlinate effects on later tiITle periods. The purpose in doing so is to 
begin to uncover the sorts of behavioural phenoITlena such an analysis iITlplies -
phenoITlena v.rhich v.rould receive fuller investigation in a genuinely historical 
analysis of the econOITlY. The ITlain assuITlption underlying the chapter is that the 
ITlost iITlportant dividing line betw"een Post KeynesianisITl and Nev.r KeynesianisITl 
concerns the degrees of realisITl in their respective understandings of individual 
behaviour. Nev.r Keynesians are strongly attached to formal, rational choice ITlod-
els, v.rhereas Post Keynesians' concern vnth tiITle, ignorance and uncertainty 
requires abandonITlent of static optiITlizing behavioural analysis and attention to 
decision ITlaking in concrete, historical circuITlstances. To sharpen this point, then, 
the chapter builds onto Dutt's path-dependency analysis of Keynes's thinking a 
Post Keynesian account of individual economic behaviour in terms of recent 
findings from the psychological literature on economic behaviour critical of ration-
ality theory. 
In the first section belov.r, Dutt's discussion of Kregel's three models in Keynes 
is briefly reviev.red to isolate the properties of Keynes's shifting equilibriuITl ITlodel 
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that favour an account of the economy as path-dependent. In the section second, 
recent experimental evidence on the psychology of individual decision making 
consistent ",ith there being a role for history in the economy is briefly summarized. 
In the third section, I supply an interpretation of Keynes's thinking in relation to 
this recent evidence about decision making that makes use of his o",n emphasis on 
the role conventions play in the economy. The final section dra",s conclusions 
about the heuristics of Keynes's models and the differences bet'-Veen N e", Key-
ncsianism and Post Keynesianism. 
STATIC, STATIONARY AND SHIFTING EQUILIBRIUM 
MODELS 
Kregel calls the model in ",hich individuals' long-period price expectations, E, are 
constant and short-period price expectations e are realized Keynes's static model, 
the model in ",hich E is constant but e may be disappointed and changing Keynes's 
stationary model, and the model in ",hich E is shifting and e may be disappointed 
Keynes's shifting equilibrium model. Only in the last, as the idea of shifting 
equilibrium suggests, are e and E interdependent. The static model appears only 
in Keynes's 1937 l~ctures, ",here it can be argued that in response to his critics and 
possible misunderstanding Keynes simplified his arguments from The General Theory 
to hammer horne the single point that <the theory of effective demand is substan-
tially the same if ",e assume that short-period expectations are al",ays fulfilled' 
(Keynes, 1973, p. 181). This suggests that he found the stationary model tactically 
inopportune, since obviously he kne", short-period expectations ",ere regularly 
disappointed, and thus that the static and stationary models ",ere together a 
conceptualization alternative to the shifting equilibrium model. It also seems fair 
to say that Keynes principally used the stationary/static model ",hen he thought a 
simplified exposition of his underemployment analysis required temporarily putting 
aside interdependence bet'-Veen e and E. The shifting equilibrium model described 
ho", the economy moved from one underemployment equilibrium to another, and 
might consequently only be appreciated once economists ",ere disabused of their 
Say's La", commitments. 
Does the shifting equilibrium model capture the idea of an economy in historical 
time? Dutt argues that ho", seriously ",e take the equilibrium method generally in 
Keynes's thinking depends upon the relative ",eight placed on t'-Vo different 
purposes for ",hieh the lllethod can be used: <to examine some qualitative property 
of the equilibrium position, and ... to attach some real-",orld significance to the 
precise position of that equilibrium' (1991-2, pp. 218-19). Keynes's main purpose 
clearly - given that reigning classical theory presupposed the equilibrium lllethod -
",as to sho", that unelllploYlllent equilibria ",ere possible, and, thus, to exhibit this 
particular qualitative property of equilibria obtained. From the perspective of this 
goal, <Issues regarding the path-dependence of equilibrium, and the role of history, 
",ere no concern of his: ",herever the econOlllY ended up, it ",as possible for it to 
end mth unemployed labor' (ibid., p. 219). But, Dutt adds, this focus is cOlllpatible 
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mth also arguing that the economy -...vas path-dependent, nor -...vould doing so 
undermine Keynes's main goal in qualitative analysis.2 And that Keynes also 
developed the shifting equilibrium model in The Genera! Theory gives good reason 
to t:hink this other goal -...vas important to him also. 
It is reasonable to ask, then, ho-...v the shifting equilibrium model may be thought 
to approximate an analysis of the economy in historical time. Suppose first, Dutt 
suggests, that the interdependence bet-...veen e and E in the model arises from 
assuming that disappointed short-period expectations3 reasonably cause firms to 
alter their long-period expectations, so that E = B(e) and E' > 0, as firms extra-
polate the near future into the distant future. This results in three possibilities.4 
First, a unique stable equilibrium may indeed exist (provided short-period expecta-
tions adjust adaptively), should -...ve assume that the relationship bet-...veen E and e 
reflects only current expectations. Here history does not matter. Second, the short-
period equilibrium may also be unstable (-...vhen investment is highly responsive to 
changes in long-period expectations, and long-period expectations are highly 
responsive to changes in short-period expectations). Here equilibrium does not 
matter. Third, under certain circumstances pertaining to the relationship bet-...veen e 
and the price of output, there may also be multiple equilibria, -...vhere -...vhether stable 
short-period equilibria are achieved depends upon the economy's starting-point. 
Here history ITlatters. 
Can the first case, then, be said to be Keynes's? Dutt's analysis is meant to sho-...v 
that a necessary condition for the economy to possess a unique stable equilibrium 
not dependent upon the econoITlY's starting point and independent of the econo-
ITly's dynamic path is that current levels of E depend on current levels of e. But 
clearly it is not very plausible to say that current disappointed short-period price 
expectations alone determine current long-period price expectations. Firms 
undoubtedly also consider past realized and unrealized short-period expectations 
in forITlulating long-period expectations, and accordingly Dutt recoITlITlends that E 
be thought also to depend upon lagged values of e. Thus suppose that 
E~ = ST kt-iet-i, the k j are -...veights and T is the length of the firITl's ITleITlory. 
Then the final equilibriuITl is path-dependent in that the final level of E mIl depend 
upon the path by -...vhich e adjusts, and history ITlatters in deterrrtining the position 
of the econOITlY in equilibriuITl. Dutt notes that this path-dependence depends 
upon the aSYITlITletry in his analysis bet-...veen ho-...v expectations are formed -...vhen 
short-period expectations are realized and ho-...v they are fonned -...vhen they are not. 
He interprets this to ITlean that ITleITlory plays a role for firms -...vhen short-period 
expectations are disappointed, but has no role -...vhen they are realized (because then 
e and E cease to be interdependent). More specifically, firITls reITleITlber their 
rrtistakes, and act to change -...vhat they regard as ITlistakes, but see no reason to 
change -...vhat they are doing -...vhen their expectations are fulfilled. 
This is surely a reasonable thing to say about the psychology of decision ITlaking 
in firITls and indeed -...vith respect to hUITlan behaviour generally. But -...vhether -...ve 
should regard Keynes's shifting equilibriuITl ITlodel as one that ITlakes history ITlatter 
in this -...vay, and indeed -...vhether Post Keynesians should give -...veight to Keynes's 
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shifting equilibrium model or develop alternative modes of historical analysis 
requires further argument. I address the first of these issues in the next two 
sections of this chapter by, first, looking at some recent experimental evidence 
concerning the psychology of individual decision making to see ",hat general sorts 
of phenomena might underlie a memory that emphasizes mistakes and errors, and 
by, second, then turning to an account of Keynes's thinking about conventions in 
the economy that dra",s on similar considerations. Comment on the latter issue of 
ho", Post Keynesians should look upon the shifting equilibrium model in addres-
sing the nature of time is reserved for the concluding section. 
THE PLACE OF ERROR IN MEMORY: RECENT EVIDENCE 
FROM EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Here I only attempt to dra", attention to a small portion of the empirical literature 
from psychologists that has attracted the interest of economists increasingly 
sceptical in recent years of the adequacy of the traditional axiomatization of 
rational choice. Of course economists have had doubts of this sort since the 
early ",ork of Simon (1957) on bounded rationality and Allais' (1952) thought 
experiments (see Allais and Hagen, 1979) challenging the independence axiom of 
expected utility theory, but it has only been in the last decade and a half that 
confidence in the a priori deductive method of explaining choice seems to have 
begun to be seriously shaken (e.g. Sugden, 1991). Three phenomena are described 
here: loss aversion, preference reversals, and time-inconsistent preferences. In each 
case, I argue that the phenomenon in question might contribute to an account of 
individual behaviour in ",hich a memory of mistakes has a role in influencing 
expectations of the future. 
Loss aversion 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) have dra",n attention to an asymmetry In ascrip-
tions of value they term loss aversion, ",hereby individuals feel that the disutility 
involved in giving up an object exceeds the utility associated mth acquiring it. Loss 
aversion may be understood to imply that individuals' evaluation of risky outcomes 
tends to reflect a status quo bias, so that there may ",ell be important irrevers-
ibilities in our preferences. Recall that the standard theory of rational choice 
assumes that indifference curves are reversible in the sense that an individual 
regarding two bundles of goods as equally valuable should be indifferent between 
having one and trading it for the other and having the second and trading it for the 
first. Having a status quo bias or being loss averse means that this may often not be 
the case, and that in certain circumstances indifference curves may even cross one 
another (cf. Knetsch, 1990). Individuals faced mth objects of equal value in their 
o",n vie", thus tend to prefer those objects that they already possess, even ",hen 
this violation of the transitivity axiom implies that they may be irrational in the 
specific sense of being a potential money pump.s 
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That prererences may orten be irreversible clearly raises serious questions about 
the adequacy and generality or the standard theory or rational choice that assumes 
individuals possess stable and unchanging prererence orders. Tversky and Kahne-
man (1991) have thus developed an alternative prererence theory that explains hov.r 
indirrerence curves may be indexed to rererence levels that count as status quo 
ractors ror individuals. One advantage or such an approach is that it improves on 
rational choice models ignoring individuals' status quo bias that generally predict 
<greater instability than is observed in the v.rodd' (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). Another advantage or their approach is that its emphasis upon irreversibil-
ities in individuals' evaluation or risky outcomes serves to place important empha-
sis upon hov.r choice may be embedded in historical time as opposed to logical 
time. That individuals tend to exhibit status quo bias might be understood to 
reflect their concern v.rith an uncertain ruture (in regard to both states or nature and 
the qualities or goods), and thus count as an errective demonstration or the idea 
that the conditions needed to apply subjective probability theory to the v.rorld do 
not alv.rays hold. 
What is the implication or loss aversion and status quo bias ror Keynes's shirting 
equilibrium model interpreted as a path-dependent analysis? On the argument that 
'\Ve disproportionately remember our mistakes, rulfilled short-period expectations 
might be regarded as choices that involve no departure rrom the status quo and no 
mistakes, i.e. as status-quo-preserving choices. In contrast, v.rhen short-period 
expectations are not realized, they might be seen as mistakes about v.rhich the 
firm relt a special aversion. On this viev.r. one should not conruse mistakes 
associated v.rith loss aversion '\Vith business or personal losses per se. since clearly 
some or a firm's mistakes may be associated '\Vith expectations that are, as it v.rere. 
overfulfilled, as when a firm's price and sales are better than expected. From the 
perspective or hov.r short-period expectations influence long-period expectations, 
that the rormer are under-or over-rulf"illed v.rould alv.rays have some impact on the 
latter. Loss aversion, then. is more a matter or hov.r a relatively settled state or 
arrairs, as manifest in a set of short-period expectations. is disturbed. either 
unfavourably or ravourably. From the point of viev.r or human psychology. indivi-
duals are thus more comfortable with modest or no change v.rhatsoever in their 
environment v.rhen raced v.rith the task of evaluating risky future prospects. 
Preference reversals 
One of the best-knov.rn psychological results that challenges standard rational 
choice theory concerns preference reversals. First demonstrated by Lichtenstein 
and Slovic (1971, 1973), and then replicated by many others, preference reversals 
occur v.rhen individuals are asked, first, to choose betv.reen tv.ro gambles of nearly 
the same expected value (one v.rith a high chance or'\Vinning a small prize and one a 
lov.r chance of v.rinning a large prize), and. second, to price each of those gambles. 
Most subjects choose the high-chance-small-prize gamble. but then put a higher 
price on the lov.r-chance-high-prize gamble. thus exhibiting v.rhat has come to be 
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known as preference reversal. Interestingly, Grether and Plott designed a set of 
experiments explicitly meant <to discredit the psychologists' ~ork as applied to 
economics' (1979, p. 623), but found themselves unable to do so. They concluded 
that <no optimisation principles of any sort lie behind the simplest of human 
choices and that the unifonnities in human choice behaviour ~hich lie behind 
market behaviour may result from principles ~hich are of a completely different 
sort than generally accepted' (ibid.). 
Subsequent research has focused on explaining the various possible causes of 
preference reversals. Some have thus supposed that preference reversals involved 
intransitive preferences, and proposed non-transitive preference choice models to 
address the problem (e.g. Loomes and Sudgen, 1983). Other researchers ques-
tioned the formulation of payoff schemes in such a manner as to test the 
independence axiom of expected utility theory (e.g. Karni and Safra, 1987). Finally, 
a third set of researchers tested procedure invariance or whether alternative ~ays of 
presenting a choice always give rise to the same ordering (Slovic et aI., 1990). The 
latter argued that intransitivities and payoff schemes explained only a relatively 
small share of preference reversals, ~hile a failure of procedure invariance accounts 
for a large portion of preference reversals. They also argued that procedure 
invariance breakdowns could be seen to be related to the compatibility of stimulus 
and response for experimental subjects involved in decisions involving both choice 
and pricing, reasoning that individuals grasp some stimuli more readily than others. 
How is this research relevant to Keynes and the issue of path-dependency? The 
failure of procedure invariance implies that different ways of presenting a choice to 
individuals change the way in which they order the options before them. In the 
view of Slovic et al. (ibid.), it suggests that individuals may not have stable and 
unchanging preferences which are elicited in one situation after another, and that 
preference is (at least in part) context dependent. Such a state of affairs wuu1d be 
just what one would expect if the economic process occurred in historical rather 
logical time. Indeed it would be consistent with Katzner's view that 'history is 
created period by period', ~hen there are 'steady alterations in the epistemic 
statuses and decision opportunities of individuals as they learn of and experience 
ne~ things' (1993, p. 343). It would also be consistent with memory of mistakes 
possessing an important role in choice if mistakes in short-period expectations 
~ere to transform the opportunities firms faced. If unrealized expectations, as 
contrasted to realized ones, were to alter <the epistemic statuses and decision 
opportunities of individuals', then firms might exhibit preference reversals and 
the economy then behave in a path-dependent manner. 
Time-inconsistent preferences 
Another well-established anomaly from the perspective of rational choice theory is 
the phenomenon of time-inconsistent preferences associated with intertemporal 
choice. It has long been recognized that individuals may ~ell exhibit negative, 
declining and variable time discount rates, as opposed to the constant rates that 
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standard theory predicts. Strotz (1955) thus demonstrated that dynamic inconsist-
encies in behaviour of the sort involving discount rates that decline over time imply 
that individuals consume more in the future than their earlier plans had permitted. 
Elster (1979) argued that individuals who revise their earlier consumption plans 
gone awry with the passage of time ought to be said to reflect a second-best 
rationality. A number of researchers have looked upon intertemporal choice as a 
manifestation of internal conflict between an individual's multiple selves, bringing 
up Arrow-type difficulties for intrapersonal as compared to interpersonal collective 
choice (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984). 
Psychologists have termed any tendency to favour the present over the future 
myopia. Its extent can depend upon a variety of factors including how choices are 
framed for individuals and whether they look upon future benefits or costs with 
favour or dread. In connection with the framing idea, it has been shown that 
individuals react differently to relative money amount differences and absolute 
money amount differences (Lowenstein and Prelec, 1989). Benzion et al. (1989) 
have shown that individuals discount time differently according to how far off a 
gain or loss lies in the future. Lowenstein (1987) showed that the maximum 
payments individuals would make to obtain or avoid various future outcomes 
also varied according to the perceived pleasantness or unpleasantness of the out-
come. More generally, individuals appear to react differently to the prospects of 
gains as compared to losses in the future. These and other similar results suggest 
intertemporal choice involves additional complications to our understanding of 
complexities of choice at a point in time. 
Intertemporal choice inconsistencies, however, are especially relevant to an 
investigation of how history might matter in the economy. If individuals system-
atically mis-estimate gains and losses at different points in the future, and often 
then find themselves in a position of wanting to revise their past choices, then they 
not only make mistakes regularly, but just as regularly make adjustments in their 
situations to accommodate those mistakes. Long-period expectations on this view 
would be sensitive to lagged values of short-period expectations in that firms 
would likely come to recognize general patterns of short-period expectation failure. 
Specifically, if errors regarding future values are a persistent feature of decision 
making, firms would be unable to correct for their future mistakes in advance, and 
would find it their best - or more accurately second-best - strategy to put 
themselves in a position regularly to discover and adjust to past mistakes. The 
economy would then be path-dependent in the sense that in each period decision 
makers would find themselves in the position of having to discover new phenom-
ena that could not previously have been anticipated. 
KEYNES AND CONVENTION 
Might Keynes have allowed that such psychological phenomena as loss aversion, 
preference reversals, and time-inconsistent preferences may play a role in the 
development of the economy over time? Though traditional choice-theoretic 
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reasoning underlies parts of The General Tbeory, Keynes also dre-.v attention to the 
animal spirits of entrepreneurs as that 'spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction' (1973a, p. 161), and thus clearly did not believe that individuals al-.vays 
behaved as constrained maximizers. In addition, many of Keynes's other -.vritings 
on history and policy, such as The Economic Consequences 0/ the Peace, demonstrate 
insight into the psychological complexities of character and personality, and it thus 
seems not unrealistic to suppose that Keynes developed his understanding of the 
behaviour of entrepreneurs and speculators alongside his understanding of polit-
icians, Treasury officials and artists. In any event, here I put aside -.vhat Keynes 
might himself have thought, and suppose that there is enough in the overall 
frame-.vork of The General Theory to allo-.v that a history of mistakes made in forming 
short-period expectations possesses a role in determining long-period expectations. 
On this analysis, Keynes's shifting equilibrium model can be understood to treat 
the economy as if it -.vere path-dependent, and to do so on account of the sorts of 
psychological characteristics of individual decision making that have been the 
subject of recent interest in the empirical literature on rational choice. 
To flesh out this argument I turn to a subject on -.vhich Keynes appears to have 
been most alive to a richer account of behaviour and individual reasoning: that is, 
his thinking about the role of conventions in the economy, specifically in connec-
tion -.vith firms' investment decisions. My strategy is to look at ho-.v Keynes 
thought conventions acted as a frame-.vork for individual decision making that 
might have enabled individuals to adjust to the sorts of psychological anomalies 
discussed above. We kno-.v that Keynes thought that individuals relied upon 
conventions -.vhen uncertainty about the future and presumably ignorance about 
the past limit rationality. But just ho-.v do conventions play this role in this decision 
making? More to the point, -.vhat specific difficulties in decision making do the 
special characteristics Keynes attributed to conventions permit individuals to 
address? On the argument here, since psychological anomalies of the sort described 
in the recent literature arise specifically in atomistic reasoning contexts, it is the 
atomistic nature of rational choice reasoning that conventions may be said to 
address and counter-balance. Conventions thus assist individual decision making 
by providing an interactionist frame-.vork for choice in comparison -.vith -.vhat 
atomistic rational choice theory assumes. 
First, then, ho-.v did Keynes understand conventions? I have argued else-.vhere 
(Davis, 1994) that Keynes's philosophical development led him to take conven-
tions to be (dynamic) structures of interdependent individual expectations.6 Con-
ventions, that is, are not habits of mind, rules of thumb, or customary practices 
that an individual might elect to consult, but rather modes of interaction bet'OVeen 
individuals all forming judgements on related matters. This comes out most clearly 
in Keynes's treatment of investment in The General Theory, in -.vhich the convention 
'that the existing state of affairs 'OVill continue indefinitely, except in so far as -.ve 
have specific reason to expect a change' (1973a, p. 156) is analysed in terms of the 
interplay bet'OVeen average expectation and individual expectation regarding the 
value of any given investment. Average expectation is redetermined daily as 
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individual investors bid and offer equity issues at various prices. Individual expec-
tations adjust daily in response to the changing average expectation of the lTlarket 
recorded as end-of-the-day values. Thus the <existing state of affairs' regarding any 
set of investlTlent prospects <'\.Vill continue indefinitely' as long as the average 
expectation regarding those investlTlents relTlains relatively settled; that is, until a 
large enough nUlTlber of individual investors <have specific reason to expect a 
change' in the value of those investlTlents. 
This interaction that conventions tend to structure between individuals, in Key-
nes's treatlTlent of both investlTlent and lTloney lTlarkets, has been recognized by 
lTlany readers of The General Theory. Less often elTlphasized, ho-wever, has been -what 
lTlakes the interaction Keynes describes an interaction in -which individuals are also 
interdependent '\.Vith one another in the very process of decision lTlaking. To see 
this difference, v.re lTlay lTlake a distinction between an individual reacting to the 
choices others lTlake, as, say, reflected in lTlarket outcOlTles, and an individual 
reacting to the thinking others are thought to elTlploy in lTlaking their choices. 
Keynes elTlphasizes that -v.rhen individual investors try to outguess the lTlarket or 
·out"Wit the crov.rd' (p. 155) they actually try to anticipate the thinking of other 
investors. They are not content, that is, to act only on the basis of hov.r others 
actually invest, but also attelTlpt to construe ho-w others reach their conclusions 
about ho-w, v.rhen and -why to invest, in order then to be in a position to forlTl an 
·opinion of -what average opinion expects average opinion to be' (p. IS6)? 
The sort of reasoning that an attention to the thinking of others requires differs 
in one ilTlportant respect frolTl -what is typically assulTled about the reasoning 
process of econolTlic agents. Whereas traditional rational choice analysis supposes 
individuals only lTlake use of their o-wn preferences, to forlTl judgelTlents about 
the thinking of others one needs to be able to see things frolTl their point of 
vie-w, or attelTlpt to grasp the nature of their preferences. One needs, in effect, to 
place oneself in the shoes of one's cOlTlpetitors. Reasoning of this sort lTlay be 
terlTled analogical in that it involves individuals -working out their o-wn thoughts 
by using the thinking of other individuals they suppose to be like theIllSelVeS and in 
silTlilar CircuIllstances as reference points. It represents a significant departure 
frOIll traditional atolllistic decision lTlaking in v.rhich inference frolTl tastes and 
circulTlstances to choice is assulTled to be strictly autonolllOUS, Robinson Crusoe 
style, in that it allov.rs individuals Illay deternline or ·colTlplete' their o-wn prefer-
ences by imagining those of others. Of course in Keynes's viev.r, investors and 
speculators -were not a collection of independent Robinson Crusoes, since -when 
the opinions of the cro-wd mattered more than the underlying essentials of an 
investIllent, individual investors v.rere likely to cobble together patterns of inference 
for theIllselves out of -what appeared to be successful intuitions and insights on 
the part of others. The passing of the age of enterprise -with the separation of 
o-wnership and management thus produced a nev.r forlll of reasoning in the 
speculative practices of modern investment markets, and this gave conventions 
as structures of interdependent decision Illaking a central role in the operation of 
the economy. 
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Generally. then. the reason why one would wish to think conventions were 
itnportant in econotnies with significant uncertainty about the future and ignorance 
about the past is straightforward. When rationality is litnited in these "\.Vays, one 
obvious and available means of attetnpting to enhance one's decision-making 
capacity is to survey and tnake use of the reasoning of others "\.Vho are similarly 
constrained. Keynes's treatment of titne and uncertainty can thus be said to 
presuppose the proposition that atotnistic individual rationality is not just bounded 
but also inadequate as an account of the interdependent decision-making process in 
"\.Vhich individuals actually engage. But ho"\.V does this general conclusion apply to the 
psychological phenomena above that have been of recent interest in the literature 
on choice anomalies? I have already suggested that loss aversion, preference 
reversals, and time-inconsistent preferences could be associated "\.Vith circumstances 
in which individuals' long-period expectations are influenced by their mistakes in 
forming short-period expectations. What remains to be done is to say how these 
sorts of phenotnena might play a role in Keynes's shifting equilibrium model by 
saying ho"\.V these problems in atomistic individual rationality "\.Vere the sorts of 
problems Keynes thought conventions addressed. More specifically, "\.Vhat remains 
to be done is to sho"\.V that loss inversion. preference reversals and time-inconsistent 
preferences produce in individuals a recourse to the sort of analogical thinking that 
conventions as structures of truly interdependent expectations make possible. 
Loss aversion and conventions 
In the case of loss aversion, "\.Ve sa"\.V that individuals tend to exhibit a status quo 
bias in their evaluation of risky prospects, and that this implied the existence of 
important irreversibilities in taste and intransitive preferences. Tversky and Kahne-
man (1991) built upon this evidence in developing an alternative preference theory 
in "\.Vhich indifference curves are indexed to reference levels that constitute status 
quo factors for individuals. If"\.Ve interpret this in terms of ho"\.V a history of 
mistakes regarding short-period expectations influences the formation of long-
period expectations, then the economy may be said to be path dependent in part 
because of the phenomenon of loss aversion. If "\.Ve no"\.V add to this account 
Keynes's thinking about conventions as structures of interdependent expectations, 
it can be argued that the reference levels Tversky and Kahneman conceptualize 
correspond to average expectations regarding firm pricing success and investment 
values across markets. Investors form their individual expectations "\.Vith the most 
recent evidence from the market in mind. Their uncertainty about the future impels 
them to investigate whether past short-period expectations have been fulfilled, and 
to incorporate this information in forming their long-period expectations. They do 
this by considering others' views about short-period performance and the pro-
spects for various investments. Individual expectations are then interdependent and 
dependent upon a complex system of reference points comprising measures of 
different market's average performance and individuals' various assessments of that 
average performance. If we take the formation of long-period expectations to 
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reflect attention to unfulfilled short-period expectations in this way, Keynes's 
understanding of conventions as structures of interdependence can be thought to 
make the loss aversion and status quo bias analysis of Kahneman and Tversky a 
part of the story of an economy's path dependency. 
Preference reversals and conventions 
We saw that preference reversals arise when individuals prefer one of a pair of risky 
gambles, but place a higher price on the other. We also saW' that though one set of 
researchers has attributed preference reversals to intransitive preferences and 
another has attributed them to problems in the formulation of payoff schemes 
(and expected utility theory's independence axiom), a case can be rnade for saying 
that most preference reversals derive from breakdowns in procedure invariance, 
W'here at issue is the cornpatibility for individuals of stirnulus and possible response. 
For Slovic eT aL (1990), this opens up the possibility that, contrary to traditional 
rationality theory, preferences may not be stable and unchanging, but rather are 
often formed in specific contexts. Such a view would be consistent 'With what 
Keynes's suggestions regarding analogical reasoning and conventions would alloW' 
about hoW' individuals constitute their own reasoning processes. When speculators 
borrow inferences and thinking from rivals and colleagues, their preferences are 
indirectly influenced by other's preferences, so that, to the extent that individuals 
have their own preferences, interdependent judgement guarantees that those pre-
ferences are always in a state of development. Then, as Katzner says, history could 
be thought to develop 'period-by-period', in that steady alteration in the terrns on 
which interdependent individuals reason about their current and past experience 
W'ould transform the opportunities they faced in an uncertain future. 
Time-inconsistent preferences and conventions 
Time-inconsistent preferences are associated 'With perverse discount rates and the 
phenomenon of individuals revising their consumption plans as the future becomes 
the present. The myopia psychologists see this reflecting is often interpreted to be 
the product of various cognitive framing effects, where, for example, individuals 
tend to assess future prospects differently according to whether they look upon 
them 'With favour or dread. An interesting contribution to this literature on the part 
of economists concerns multiple selves analysis. They argue that just as there are a 
variety of interpersonal collective choice problems, so there may also be said to be 
a variety of parallel intrapersonal collective choice problems in which the single 
individual is seen to possess multiple utility functions. Such an analysis, it seems, is 
not much removed from W'hat Keynes believes to be involved in conventions as 
structures of interdependent judgement. Thus to the extent that investors try to 
anticipate ~what average opinion expects average opinion to be' (1973a, p. 156), 
they effectively acquire multiple selves whose opinions compete with one another 
in such a manner that the voice that periodically emerges as uppermost for the 
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individual investor is often enough later seen as ill-advised and myopic. Certainly 
time-inconsistent preferences and perverse discount rates are no stranger to spec-
ulation. Long-period expectation formation here too, then, might be said to be the 
product of past patterns of unfulfilled short-period expectations. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Keynes has generally been understood to have placed considerable emphasis upon 
dernonstrating that an econorny in equilibriurn could have unernployrnent. Indeed 
his attention to the static rnodel version of his theory in his post-General Theory 
writings is cornmonly taken as a tactic for cornrnunicating with readers strongly 
wedded to equilibriurn thinking. This hardly implies, however, that he thought the 
econorny was not path-dependent or that history did not matter to the develop-
rnent of the econorny. Indeed, a case can be made for just such a view based on 
Dutt's interpretation of Keynes's shifting equilibriurn rnodel. It should be noted, 
then, that the discussion here is not rneant to imply that, given a longer life, Keynes 
would have built upon an interaction between short-period and long-period 
expectations in the manner of this chapter to utilize the sort of recent psychological 
evidence regarding individual behaviour the chapter surveys. It is rather rneant to 
show, first, that Keynes's understanding of conventions as structures of interde-
pendent expectations reflects an understanding of hurnan decision rnaking that 
draws on thernes sirnilar in nature to those in recent ernpirical research in psycho-
logy, and, second, that this shared view of hurnan decision rnaking permits an 
account of the econorny operating in historical tirne. Frorn this perspective, it is 
suggested that Keynes's views about interactive decision rnaking cornbined with 
recent ernpirical research in psychology provide foundations for a Post Keynesian 
account of individual econornic behaviour in real tirne that is significantly different 
to that which New Keynesianisrn allows. 
This last point deserves cornrnent. Arguably one irnportant reason why tradi-
tional, ISLM I<:eynesians have been unable to respond effectively to the New 
Classicals' attack on Keynesian thinking in recent years is that they accepted the 
neoclassical clairn that rnacroeconornic thinking needs to be erected on a micro-
foundations base of atornistic rational choice theory. New Keynesian thinking in 
this respect represents not a return to Keynes, but rather an effort to supplernent 
traditional Keynesian theory with rational expectations-rational choice foundations 
that are cornplicated by inforrnation asyrnrnetries, strategic complernentarity, 
irnperfect cornpetition, etc. Keynes, we rnight say, anticipated this kind of New 
Keynesian innovation with his own emphasis upon the limitations in hurnan 
decision rnaking and individuals' consequent recourse to conventional behaviour. 
Post Keynesians recognize this distinctive elernent in Keynes's views when they 
ernphasize the irnportance of uncertainty about the future. The recornrnendation of 
this chapter is that Post Keynesians should further supplernent this insight with an 
account of ignorance about the past and in terms of a general view of decision 
rnaking in historical time. 
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NOTES 
1 The debate originated in Davidson's assertion that 'hysteresis does not deal ...vith the 
itnpact of those societal historical changes which create a true uncertainty environment for 
many economic decisions' (1991, p. 133). Davidson (1993) is a response to Cross's 
argument that hysteretic processes are non-ergodic. 
2 Though it does rule out that technocratic fine-tuning of the economy by fiscal and 
monetary policy means is possible. 
3 The analysis of disappointed short-period expectations is put in all-or-nothing terITIS to 
sitnplify the discussion. As one (anonymous) reader to the chapter pointed out, expecta-
tions normally comprehend a range of possible outcomes. 
4 See Dutt (1991-2) for exposition of the model on which the follo'\.Ving depends. 
5 Were an individual's preferences intransitive (a > b > c > a) and the individual willing to 
pay some amount to exchange a less preferred for a more preferred good, others could 
trade ...vith this individual until 'pumping out' all of the individual's ITIoney or '\.Vealth. 
6 See Littleboy (1990) for a general discussion of Keynes on convention. 
7 Keynes allo'\.Vs that this sort of higher-order 'second' guessing ITIay occur in many markets. 
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